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Judicial Participation in Settlement:
Pattern, Practice, and Ethics
The Alternative Dispute Resolution' movement has received serious
public attention in the last dozen or so years. 2 Throughout the United
States, mechanisms for ADR are being established as significant sub-
stitutes for traditional litigation.' Underlying this recent growth in the
movement is the assumption that settlement4 of disputes benefits the
clients, the courts, and society in general to a greater extent than does
complete adjudication.' It is believed that settlement of disputes reduces
backlog of cases and overcrowded dockets,6 decreases expense by elim-
inating the costs of discovery, trial, and appeals,7 and, because it entails
more party autonomy and freedom of negotiation than traditional liti-
gation, is perceived by the parties as yielding fairer outcomes.8
However, the ADR movement is not without its detractors.9 One oft-
articulated criticism focuses on the disagreement over the appropriate
role of judges when participating in ADR, particularly in pretrial set-
1. The term "dispute resolution" encompasses a variety of mechanisms, including
negotiation, arbitration, mediation, conciliation, and settlement. This Note will focus on
settlement, particularly in the pretrial context.
2. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L.
REv. 668, 668 (1986). Dispute resolution techniques have been utilized for years. "That
they are now being characterized as innovative reflects the extent to which they are being
institutionalized and applied in new situations, and the increased level of expectation being
attached to them." NATIONAL INST. FOR Dis. RES., PATHS TO JUSTICE: MAJOR PUBLIC
POLICY ISSUES OF DISPUTE RESOLTrrION 5 (1984).
3. Edwards, supra note 2, at 669.
4. Settlement is an out-of-court agreement in which a party withdraws pending
litigation from the court in exchange for a compromise with the other party. BLACKS
LAW DICTIONARY 993 (5th ed. 1979).
5. Wall, Rude & Schiller, Judicial Participation in Settlement, 1984 Mo. J. DIS.
RES. 25, 26 (1985).
6. Wall & Schiller, Judicial Involvement in Pre-Trial Settlement: A Judge is Not
a Bump on a Log, 6 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 27, 28 (1982). This belief is not shared by
all commentators. Certain literature suggests that "dedicating judicial resources to active
participation in settlement neither speed[s] dispositions nor increase[s] the productivity
of judges," and even indicates that the inverse may be true. Galanter, "" . . A Settlement
Judge, Not a Trial Judge". Judicial Mediation in the United States, 12 J. L. & Soc'Y
1, 7-8 (1985). See also Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses
of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REv. 485, 494 (1985) (showing
that federal district courts with the greatest degree of settlement activity also had the
smallest number of civil dispositions). See also Oesterle, Trial Judges in Settlement
Discussions: Mediators or Hagglers?, 9 CORNELL L. FORUM 7, 9 (1982).
7. Wall, Rude & Schiller, supra note 5, at 26-27.
8. Galanter, supra note 6, at 3.
9. Principal among them is Professor Owen Fiss, who believes settlement is often
institutionalized on a wholesale or indiscriminate basis, and is therefore not preferable
over judgment. He analogizes ADR to plea bargaining, and maintains that it is tainted
with the same attendant flaws: coercion, imbalance of power, and miscarriages of justice.
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tlement conferences.'0 Should they adopt an aggressive or "activist"
stance, or are the interests of justice better served by an exercise of
judicial passivity and restraint? What are the dangers inherent in per-
mitting judges to unilaterally set the tone and pace of pre-trial pro-
ceedings, a task traditionally reserved for attorneys and their clients?
Finally, does active judicial involvement in ADR violate the ethical
Canons embodied in the Code of Judicial Conduct? In order to respond
to these questions, it is useful to understand: (1) the degree of involvement
and intervention in litigation demonstrated by judges historically; (2)
the extent to which the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(FRCP) in 1938 broadened the scope of permissive intervention; (3) the
extent to which judges have increased their participation in resolution
of disputes as a result of the promulgation of the Rules; and (4) the
degree to which, if at all, the practices and methods currently employed
by judges in the promotion of settlement violate the ethical considerations
embodied in the Code of Judicial Conduct.
I. INVOLVEMENT OF THE JUDICIARY IN SETTLEMENT
PRIOR TO THE ADOPTION OF THE FRCP
Under the traditional or classical view of the judicial role in the
American Legal establishment, judges were not "supposed to have an
involvement or interest in the controversies they adjudicate[d]." In the
words of Dean Roscoe Pound:
[I]n America we take it as a matter of course that a judge should be a mere umpire,
to pass upon objections and hold counsel to the rules of the game, and that the
parties should fight out their own game in their own way without judicial interference.
We resent such interference as unfair, even when in the interest of justice. 2
"Disengagement and dispassion supposedly enable[d] judges to decide
cases fairly and impartially." 3 An unbiased disposition was facilitated
Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L. J. 1073, 1073-76 (1984). What Fiss ignores, however,
are the protective factors incorporated in court-annexed ADR which are designed to
prevent financial imbalances of power from coercing settlement, i.e., judicial participation.
Furthermore, in most instances, settlement is synonymous with termination, and return
trips to the judge for illumination or enforcement of the terms are unnecessary. See Wall,
Rude & Schiller, supra note 5, at 27. Moreover, Fiss neglects to offer much empirical
support for his contentions, and fails to make any distinction between the applicability
of his criticisms in the ADR context as opposed to the more traditional adjudicatory
process. Thus, it is difficult to discern exactly the thrust of Professor Fiss' objections.
10. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 6, at 488.
11. Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376 (1982).
12. Fox, Settlement: Helping the Lawyers to Fulfill Their Responsibility, 53 F.R.D.
129, 137 (1971). These words were used by Pound as a preface to a scathing commentary
on the out-dated, cumbersome, and ineffective procedural methods utilized by the legal
establishment before the adoption of the FRCP.
13. Resnik, supra note 11, at 376.
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by the judge's lack of involvement in case preparation and control over
issue delineation and scheduling of the docket. In most instances, judges
were not privy to pretrial machinations; they only became involved in
the litigation when a particular type of judicial action was requested
by one of the parties. 4 In this manner, "the judge [became] the trustee
of the assurance of justice .. .[h]e preside[d], he administer[ed], he
decide[d]. '"' Thus, in a historical sense, the sanctity of the American
adversarial system was "untainted" by judicial participation in litigation
in the preliminary stages.
The complacency with which the detached judicial posture in the
American legal system was regarded was rather abruptly altered in
1929. In that year, the Circuit Court of Wayne County, Michigan,
discovered that its civil docket was backlogged for almost four years. 6
This prompted the Court to devise a system of voluntary pretrial
conferences between the lawyers and a judge in the hope of promoting
settlement by facilitating issue identification, resolving evidence ques-
tions, and disposing of preliminary motions. 7 The results were promising, 8
and several other cities soon followed suit. 9 The chain reaction culmi-
nated with the adoption of federal rules establishing procedural guidelines
and requirements at various stages of litigation, most notably, for our
purposes, at the pretrial stage."
II. EFFECT OF THE ADOPTION OF THE FRCP ON
JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT IN SETTLEMENT
Judicial involvement in litigation in the form of pretrial conferences
received explicit federal approval and promotion with the adoption of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. Of the eighty-six Rules
existing today, three-Rules 1, 16, and 83-have either a direct or
indirect effect on alternative dispute resolution processes, particularly
on efforts to resolve disputes by settlement.
14. Id. at 384 (e.g., a motion for summary judgment, a date for trial, or a pretrial
conference). See also Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role
in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 770, 770 (1981).
15. J. BORKIN, THE CORRUPT JUDGE 9 (1962).
16. Oesterle, supra note 6, at 7. See also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 6, at 490
(tracing the origins of modern judicial promotion of case disposition to judicial attempts
to apply "Scandinavian conciliation techniques" to cases before them).
17. Oesterle, supra note 6, at 7. See also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 6, at 490-91.
18. Oesterle, supra note 6, at 7 (the waiting time for trial was cut from forty-five
months to twelve to fifteen months).
19. Id. at 7; Fox, supra note 12, at 133; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 6, at 491; FED.
R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note I.
20. Oesterle, supra note 6, at 7; Fox, supra note 12, at 133.
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Rule 1 states, in pertinent part, that "[the Rules] shall be construed
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action."2' The language of the Rule suggests that judges are given broad
discretion (if used properly) over trial procedure. Thus, judges have
interpreted the rule as an implicit grant of authority for judicial inter-
vention in the promotion of settlement,2 especially in light of the growing
body of support for the idea that settlement is superior to adjudication
in terms of securing "speedy and inexpensive determination" of lawsuits.
The judicial role in pretrial settlement promotion was further expanded
by Rule 16.? The Rule, as originally drafted and adopted, provided for
pretrial conferences as "vehicles for narrowing issues at trial," but did
not approve their use as a forum for settlement discussions.? The Rule
was amended in 1983, however, to "strengthen the hand of the trial
judge in brokering settlements: The 'facilitation of settlement' became
an express purpose of pretrial conferences, and participants were . ..
encouraged (not required) to consider 'the possibility of settlement or
the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve their dispute.' "'
The amendment was prompted, in part, by a reluctance on the part
of many judges to engage actively in pretrial dispute resolution efforts
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
22. One commentator has noted that while speed and inexpensiveness are important
considerations, they should not be pursued at the cost of justice. See Note, Judicial
Authority in the Settlement of Federal Civil Cases, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 171, 175
(1985).
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 16 reads in relevant part:
(a) Pretrial Conferences; Objectives. In any action, the court may in its discretion
direct the attorneys for the parties ... to appear before it for a conference or
conferences before trial for such purposes as (1) expediting the disposition of the
action; (2) establishing early and continuing control so that the case will not be
protracted because of lack of management; (3) discouraging wasteful pretrial
activities; ... (5) facilitating the settlement of the case. ...
(c) Subjects to be Discussed at Pretrial Conferences. The participants at any
conference under this rule may consider and take action with respect to . .. (7)
the possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the
dispute; ... (11) such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.
(f) Sanctions. If a party or party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial
order, or if no appearance is made on behalf of a party at a scheduling or pretrial
conference, or if a party or party's attorney is substantially unprepared to participate
in the conference, or if a party or party's attorney fails to participate in good
faith, the judge, upon motion or the judge's own initiative, may make such orders
with regard thereto as are just.... In lieu of or in addition to any other sanction,
the judge shall require the party or the attorney representing the party or both
to pay the reasonable expenses incurred because of any noncompliance with this
rule, including attorney's fees. . ..
Id.
24. Oesterle, supra note 6, at 7.
25. Fiss, supra note 9, at 1073-74.
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without more explicit guidance or permission from the Rule, despite
the existence of empirical evidence showing that early intervention in
the form of judicial assumption of control over the case resulted in
disposition by settlement or a more efficient, less costly trial.26 The
problem of judicial reticence was compounded by a surge in volume
and complexity of cases after 1938.27 In response to the needs of modern
litigation, the Rule was finally amended in 1983 to reflect the congres-
sional opinion that facilitation of case settlement was a proper function
of pretrial conferences (Rule 16(a)(5)).
Another provision of Rule 16 which impacts upon early resolution,
in a less direct way, is Rule 16(0, which imposes sanctions against any
party who fails to obey a pretrial order, fails to participate in the
conference in good faith, or is substantially unprepared to participate
in the conference." The Advisory Committee notes to Rule 16(0 ex-
plicitly indicate that the drafters intended the Rule to have the effect
of encouraging forceful judicial management. Imposition on parties and
attorneys of this kind of subtle pressure facilitates settlement efforts
advanced by the judge by making parties more predisposed to resolution
endeavors, for fear of the potential consequences of refusal.
Finally, Rule 83 fosters judicial participation in settlement by giving
district courts power to "regulate their practice in any manner not
inconsistent with [the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure]" thereby pro-
viding judges with flexibility and a degree of autonomy over the extent
to which they can administer the calendar and exert control over the
cases on their dockets.30
Clearly, then, the adoption of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
combined with subsequent amendments to them, have had a persuasive
and profound effect on the involvement of the judiciary in pretrial
settlement negotiations. One recent study revealed that seventy-five
percent of federal judges and over half of state judges initiated dis-
26. FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's notes (1983 amendment) (citing S.
FLANDERS, CASE MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN UNITED STATES DiSTRicT
COURTS 17 (1977)).
27. Resnik attributes this growth spurt to four factors: (1) population growth; (2)
congressional creation of several new legal rights and redressable wrongs; (3) increase in
the number of lawyers; and, (4) new incentives to litigate due to congressional approval
of payment of attorney's fees to certain successful parties. Resnik, supra note 11, at 396-
97.
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's notes (1983 amendment). However, it
is important to stress that active judicial involvement in settlement was practiced by large
segments of the judiciary even before the Rule was amended. Judge Noel P. Fox, Chief
Judge of the District Court for the Western District of Michigan in 1977, expressed the
judge's role in terms of duty: "It is clear that a federal judge has the positive duty to
advance a case to a just, inexpensive and expeditious resolution." (emphasis added). Fox,
supra note 12, at 132.
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(0.
30. Fox, supra note 12, at 132.
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cussions which ultimately led to settlement.3 Today, about ninety percent
of all cases filed, both civil and criminal, are disposed of without trial. 2
However, the degree of involvement and frequency with which judicial
participation in dispute resolution occurs is not uniform. A significant
portion of judges take full advantage of the opportunity to promote
settlement negotiations. Some, however, harbor certain reservations and
appear reluctant to adopt an aggressive or "activist" stance. A contrast
of passive and aggressive techniques reveals why different judges prefer
one approach over the other, and accounts for the higher frequency of
utilization of passive techniques over aggressive ones.
Given the benefits to be derived from resolution of disputes before
litigation and the flexibility in negotiation provided by the FRCP, it is
not surprising that judges and lawyers have employed a vast range of
settlement methods. Three commentators, Wall, Rude, and Schiller,
have identified over seventy separate techniques utilized in civil cases.33
These range from "passive" approaches, such as talking with both lawyers
about settlement, calling a certain settlement figure reasonable, chan-
neling discussions in a certain direction, and analyzing the case for a
lawyer, to so-called aggressive techniques, such as speaking personally
with the client to persuade him to accept the settlement offer, requiring
one client to pay the other client's attorney fees and expenses, giving
information to the lawyer with a weaker case, and threatening to discuss
an attorney's recalcitrance with a senior member of the attorney's firm.'
Although a survey conducted by the commentators revealed that
judges or lawyers had observed or used all the above-mentioned tech-
niques, they were not utilized with the same degree of frequency. Of
963 participants polled, an average of approximately eighty-two percent
31. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 6, at 497. This may be due, in significant part, to
their perception that settlement benefits them directly by lightening their workload. See
Wall, Rude & Schiller, supra note 5, at 25.
32. Will, Merhige & Rubin, The Role of the Judge in the Settlement Process, 75
F.R.D. 203, 203 (1978). See also Galanter, supra note 6, at 3. Fiss cites this high
percentage figure as support for his criticism that settlement necessarily strips the judiciary
of its law-making power because the judge's opinion of the cases which he helps settle
are never written or reported and thus cannot be used as precedential authority. Fiss has
a good point, but it needs refinement. As Menkel-Meadow notes, most cases are not "of
the 'structural-reform' variety," and processing them through traditional adjudicative
methods serves no useful purpose-they should be settled. Menkel-Meadow, supra note
6, at 501. However, this author agrees with Fiss that cases involving controversial issues,
establishing legal precedents, and clarifying existing laws should be resolved through
traditional litigation. Fiss, supra note 9, at 1085-86. This opinion is shared by the National
Institute for Dispute Resolution. See NATIONAL INST. FOR Dis. REs., supra note 2, at
10. ("[Courts] are the appropriate forum when the purpose is to establish a societal norm
or a legal precedent.").
33. Wall, Rude & Schiller, supra note 5, at 27.
34. Id. at 34-38.
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engaged in the passive activities, while only an estimated eighteen percent
admitted using or observing aggressive approaches.
3 1
It is uncertain what precise considerations influence judicial partici-
pation, but two factors which appear to affect the utilization of the
individual mechanisms are the "perceived effectiveness of the technique
and the cost, in terms of time and resources, of its application.136 This
may result in a no-win situation. If a judge does not have the requisite
time to acquaint himself with all the facts of the case, or to engage in
extensive pretrial settlement conferences, et cetera, he will be less able
to effectuate meaningful dispute resolution. This will result in a backlog
of cases, which in turn renders a judge subject to serious temporal
constraints. Thus, unless a particular judge is not burdened by an
overcrowded docket, which is highly improbable, he may not have the
resources available to pursue active alternative dispute resolution. This
may account for the greater use of passive techniques in the pretrial
settlement process. On the other hand, knowledge of an overburdened
docket may compel judges to take special pains to expedite resolution
of disputes, in the hopes of alleviating the lengthy backlog.37
Research also suggests that judges are more apt to get personally
involved in resolving jury cases of a particularly complex nature on the
assumption that relatively simple fact patterns are left to the jury
members, who are deemed capable of resolving the dispute effectively."
Judges also tend to concentrate their dispute resolution efforts on
lengthy cases39 in order to achieve a reduction in case delay. "The
commonly held belief is that [a] case which will involve an extensive
trial and will delay subsequent cases by a substantial amount of time
should be settled in order to avoid extensive delay."'
Another factor which influences judges' willingness to participate in
settlement negotiations is the amount in controversy.41 Specifically, judges
seek to keep small cases out of court. Two reasons explain their stressing
settlement of small cases rather than large ones: (1) bringing to trial
the millions of cases which are filed each year in the civil courts would
cripple the legal system; and, (2) it is grossly inefficient to spend more
money trying a case than the case itself is worth.4 Thus, judges tend
to engage in active settlement efforts in large, complex, time-consuming
cases and cases that involve a small amount in controversy.
35. Id. at 34.
36. Id. at 39.
37. Id. at 40.
38. Id. at 41.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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The degree of judicial participation practiced during pretrial settlement
may be a product of other influences not readily discernible. For instance,
some judges reported that they were more predisposed to intervene in
settlement procedures where they viewed the attorneys as lacking ne-
gotiation skills and where they perceived themselves as excellent ne-
gotiators.4 3 Some judges have indicated that participation in ADR induces
a sense of accomplishment and control, 44 and also tends to be more
"fun" than traditional adjudicatory processes. 45
Thus, given the plethora of techniques available for use by judges in
settlement promotion, and the myriad reasons for actively employing
them, the natural conclusion is that judicial intervention in ADR is
practiced in a uniform manner. However, when asked what role they
typically assume in civil settlement conferences, approximately twenty-
two percent of 2,500 judges surveyed responded that they "did not
intervene, but 'allow[ed] opposing counsel to try to reach a settlement
on their own."' 6 This suggests that a fair amount of justices harbor
reservations about becoming meaningful participants in ADR, and may
account for the unwillingness of certain judges to engage in active
promotion of dispute resolution by settlement.
One commentator has suggested that the extent and type of judicial
involvement in settlement is controlled by one overriding consideration:
"[j]udges are more apt to use techniques which are considered ethical
by the judicial community."'4 Of the aggressive techniques noted pre-
viously, approximately fifty percent of the attorneys polled had observed
their use, yet roughly forty-three percent thought employment of those
types of ADR techniques unethical,48 some going so far as to say they
"represented illegal and impeachable offenses. '49 For example, forty
percent of the lawyers surveyed expressed the opinion that a judge
siding with the stronger party in order to force agreement constituted
unethical behavior on the judge's part, but nevertheless, as many as
twenty-eight percent reported observing the technique utilized in various
cases.' Some critics of ADR even claimed that promoters of the
movement are motivated by an unethical desire to limit the work of
the courts in areas affecting minority interests, civil rights, and civil
liberties.5' As a result, judges may refrain from active participation in
43. Galanter, supra note 6, at 8.
44. Id. at 13.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 7 (quoting J. RYAN, AMERICAN TRIAL JUDGES: THEIR WORK STYLES AND
PERFORMANCE 177 (1980)).
47. Wall, Rude & Schiller, supra note 5, at 38.
48. Id. at 35-38.
49. Id. at 38.
50. Id. at 37.
51. Edwards, supra note 2, at 668-69.
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settlement negotiations as a purely reactionary mechanism for fear that
they may overstep the bounds of "ethical" or prudent behavior.
Are the perceptions and apprehensions of these judges accurate? Are
all types of judicial intervention in ADR unethical, or do only certain
extreme methods fall outside the realm of acceptable judicial behavior?
How these questions are ultimately resolved may have serious and far-
reaching effects on both dispute resolution as it is currently practiced
and on the direction in which it is heading.
III. THE ETHICS OF JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT IN SETTLEMENT
The public perception of ethics 2 in the legal profession (or lack
thereof) is contradictory at best. On one hand, lawyers are perceived
by the public as having significantly lower ethical standards than not
only doctors and dentists, but most people in general.53 Judges, on the
other hand, have been traditionally held in the highest popular regard
and even reverence. "Consciously and unconsciously, society has elevated
the judge to a carefully protected eminence."' Thus, evidence of any
judicial wrongdoing or involvement in scandalous or immoral activity is
usually cause for great societal anxiety and alarm.55 Rather than risk
behavior that might ble construed as unethical or result in public con-
demnation, many judges understandably refrain from active participation
in settlement negotiations completely.
Unfortunately, reference to the Code will not aid the scrupulous judge
in his search for a definition of his proper role in this regard. The Code
of Judicial Conducts6 was adopted by the American Bar Association in
August, 1972 and was drafted for the purpose of establishing standards
which could be applied to both state and federal judges. Canons 1, 2,
and 3, however, could be interpreted as restrictions on judicial involve-
ment in ADR.
Canon 1 states that "[a] judge should uphold the integrity and
independence of the judiciary."57 An independent judiciary, i.e., one free
52. Ethics is defined as the discipline dealing with what is good and bad and with
moral duty and obligation; a set of morals or values; the principles of conduct governing
an individual or a group. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 426 (9th
ed. 1985).
53. 0. PHILLIPS & P. McCoY, CONDUCT OF JUDGES AND LAWYERS ix (1952).
54. J. BORKIN, supra note 15, at 10; see also L. GOLDBERG & E. LEVENSON, LAWLESS
JUDGES iii-iv (1935).
55. J. BORKIN, supra note 15, at 17.
56. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1984). The preface to the Code indicates the
standards that judges should observe, and the "Canons and text establish mandatory
standards unless otherwise indicated." Id.
57. Id. Canon 1 states in full:
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our
society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and en-
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from influences (be they political or otherwise) "that exceed the four
corners of the case presented for disposition,"5 is crucial "if the judiciary
is to receive the respect and support it requires to function effectively."5
This is especially true given the summary power vested in a judge,
particularly when disposing of a case by settlement, for three reasons:
(1) he has the authority to control the administration of the proceedings
and the conduct of counsel, (2) he possesses a tremendous amount of
discretion, and, (3) the lack of formal adjudication virtually eliminates
the possibility of subsequent judicial review of the proceedings.' Judges
who violate the Canons in exercising their abundant authority may find
themselves subject to disciplinary action in the form of reprimand,
suspension, disbarment, or removal from the bench.6
For example, in In re Terry, 2 Canon 1 was cited as authority for
the suspension of a judge partially on the ground of unduly interfering
with the attorneys' presentation of their cases.63 The existence on the
books of this and similar cases" may deter many judges from vigorously
promoting settlement for fear that it will be construed as violative of
Canon 1. Moreover, it may account for the predominance in practice
of the use of passive techniques over active ones.
Canons 2 and 3 can also be interpreted as suppressive of active judicial
involvement in settlement activity. Both address the concern that the
judiciary remain steadfastly impartial in their treatment of each case.
Canon 2 mandates that "[a] judge should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all of his activities." Subsection A of
Canon 2 states that a judge "should conduct himself at all times in a
manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary."65 This includes freely and willingly accepting restrictions
forcing, and should observe, high standards of conduct so that the integrity
and independence of the judiciary may be preserved. The provisions of
this Code should be construed and applied to further that objective.
Id.
58. Kaufman, Lions or Jackals: The Function of a Code of Judicial Ethics, in
SELECTED READINGS: JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL 5-6 (G. Winters ed. 1973).
59. J. BORKIN, supra note 15, at 20.
60. Buckley, The Commission of Judicial Qualifications: An Attempt to Deal with
Judicial Misconduct, in SELECTED READINGS: JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL 60
(G. Winters ed. 1973).
61. Id. at 65.
62. 323 N.E.2d 192 (Ind. 1975).
63. D. FRETZ, R. PEEPLES & T. WICKER, ETHICS FOR JUDGES 8-9 (1982).
64. See, e.g., Steinberg v. Ogden Foods Inc., 501 F.2d 1339 (6th Cir. 1974); Nebraska
Pub. Power Dist. v. Austin Power Inc., 773 F.2d 960 (8th Cir. 1984) (per curiam);
McCargo v. Hedrick, 545 F.2d 393 (4th Cir. 1976); In re LaMarre, 494 F.2d 753 (6th
Cir. 1974); J. M. Cleminshaw Co. v. City of Norwich, 93 F.R.D. 338 (D. Conn. 1981).
65. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 56, Canon 2. Canon 2 provides:
A. A judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct
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on his conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary
citizen."
Canon 3 imposes on a judge the affirmative obligation to perform
the duties of his office impartially and diligently.67 Included in the
definition of judicial duties are all the duties of a judge's office prescribed
by law.6" Canons 2 and 3, particularly Canon 3, are the most troublesome
to a judge concerned about active involvement in dispute resolution,
which, although more efficient and less expensive than traditional ad-
judication, also carries with it the potential danger that it may, in
practice, be considered violative of the ethical standards on which the
Code of Judicial Conduct is based.
When judges become intricately involved in case management at the
beginning stages, they naturally negotiate at length and with great
frequency with the parties over scheduling, issue clarification, and the
possibility of settlement.69 Pretrial proceedings are usually informal,
himself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
B. A judge should not allow his family, social, or other relationships
to influence his judicial conduct or judgment. He should not lend the
prestige of his office to advance the private interests of others; nor should
he convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a
special position to influence him. He should not testify as a character
witness.
Id.
66. Id.
67. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 56, Cannon 3. Cannon 3 provides, in
part:
The judicial duties of a judge take precedence over all his other activities.
His judicial duties include all the duties of his office prescribed by law.
In the performance of these duties, the following standards apply:
A. Adjudicative responsibilities.
(I) A judge should be faithful to the law and maintain professional
competence in it. He should be unswayed by partisan interests,
public clamor, or fear of criticism.
(2) A judge should maintain order and decorum in proceedings
before him.
(3) A judge should be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants,
jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom he deals in
his official capacity, and should require similar conduct of
lawyers ....
(4) A judge should accord to every person who is legally interested
in a proceeding, or his lawyer, full right to be heard according to
law, and, except as authorized by law, neither initiate nor consider
ex parte or other communications concerning a pending or im-
pending proceeding . . ..
Id.
68. Id.
69. Resnik, supra note 11, at 378.
JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
unstructured meetings," during which the judge is presented with the
opportunity to become more familiar with the attorneys and litigants,
and may thus develop favorable or unfavorable impressions of them
based on personality, demeanor, attitude, or other character traits which
have no bearing on the merits of the litigation. He may become pre-
disposed to one party for personal reasons, and this bias may affect his
ability to impartially judge the factual or legal merits of the case. The
likely result of this scenario is an error in judgment or a miscarriage
of justice, either of which may reflect badly on the judge's ability to
render fair decisions or may call into question his integrity.
In addition, a judge may become exposed to information during
informal pretrial proceedings that may not otherwise constitute admis-
sible evidence at trial. Unfortunately, because "a bell cannot be unrung,"
the judge "may [already] have a tainted view of the facts before the
trial even begins."'" If this bias manifests itself, particularly during a
jury trial, the chances of a fair resolution of the case are near impossible.
A judge's position and the respect with which he is addressed by counsel
leads jurors and witnesses to believe that the judge is infallible.72 Thus,
any indication from the judge of his opinion of any matter involved in
the case, whether it be shaking of his head in disbelief 3 or even a
cordial greeting to a witness, may be adopted by the jurors, consciously
or unconsciously, as their own opinion. "This type of influence is almost
impossible to counteract, even if counsel should detect it."'74 Moreover,
the likelihood of its occurrence is increased when a judge becomes
immersed in the details of a case and familiar with the personalities of
the parties involved. He may become swayed in favor of one litigant
without consciously realizing it.75
In addition, much of the information disclosed to a judge during
pretrial proceedings is imparted ex parte, and thus deprives the opposing
70. Id. at 407.
71. Note, supra note 22, at 183.
72. Buckley, supra note 60, at 60.
73. Porcaro v. United States, 784 F.2d 38 (1st Cir. 1986). In this case, the defendant
alleged:
The trial judge would look at the jury and make faces, shake his head
in disbelief, look at the ceiling ... use obvious jesters (sic) and mannerisms
whenever defense witnesses testified conveying to the jury that the defense
witness should not be believed. Yet whenever a government witness tes-
tified, the trial judge would express a genuine interest and nod his head
in approval looking directly at the witness, then at the jury.
Id. at 41.
74. Buckley, supra note 60, at 60.
75. In the words of Thomas Jefferson: "All know the influence of interest in the mind
of man and how unconsciously his judgment is warped by that influence." See Goldberg
& Levenson, supra note 54, at vi.
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party of the opportunity to hear it and challenge its validity.76 The
assumption that ex parte proceedings pose a threat to the independence
of the judiciary has been made explicit by Canon 3A(4): "A judge
should accord to every person who is legally interested in a proceeding,
or his lawyer, full right to be heard according to law, and, except as
authorized by law, neither initiate nor consider [substantive] ex parte
or other communications concerning a pending or impending proceeding
. . -"' Accordingly, in In re Conduct of Jordan,78 it was held improper
for a judge to discuss a case with an important witness in the case,
and in Maneikis v. State,2 the Indiana Court of Appeals held that
Canon 3A(4) was violated when a judge discussed with a litigant the
litigant's desire to have the attorney withdrawn and to substitute new
counsel in his stead. Likewise, in In re Boyd,80 a judge was found to
have violated the Code of Judicial Conduct when he received a mem-
orandum from an attorney in the case and did not inform opposing
counsel of that fact. Although the Supreme Court and lower federal
courts have declined to rule on the effect pretrial involvement has on
judicial interest,8' it is certainly possible that increased participation
paves the way for diminished impartiality. Although Canon 3, as recently
amended, does not prohibit a judge from engaging in non-substantive
ex parte communications on procedural matters and matters affecting
prompt disposal of the business of the court, it may be difficult in
practice to isolate substantive issues from non-substantive ones during
a pretrial discussion. Thus, the amendment may not achieve the desired
effect of ensuring judicial impartiality in case disposition.
Yet another result of judicial involvement in settlement may bring
judges in conflict with the ethical aspirations mandated by the American
Bar Association, particularly the portion of Canon 3A(1) which dictates
that a judge should be "unswayed by . . . public clamor, or fear of
criticism."8 Professor Resnik notes that the relatively recent concern
over clearing court dockets has led to a disposition "obsession" among
some judges. She suggests that urging judges to promote settlement and
effectuate case termination may be teaching judges to pay more attention
to their statistics rather than to the quality of their dispositions.83
Ironically, this development was prompted by what was initially perceived
as a benefit of the movement towards accelerated case processing:4 as
76. Resnik, supra note 11, at 427.
77. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 56, Canon 3.
78. 624 P.2d 1074 (Or. 1981).
79. 411 N.E.2d 669 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
80. 308 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1975).
81. Resnik, supra note 11, at 428.
82. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 56, Canon 3.
83. Resnik, supra note 11, at 380.
84. Id. at 416.
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court administrators collected data on the number and type of case
terminations, as well as which judges were credited with them, "lazy"
judges became pressured to be more diligent in fulfilling the demands
of their office. However, the availability of additional information also
had the undesirable effect of inducing a competitive quality into judicial
case management. When a judge perceives that his ability and past
performance are assessed by the public, attorneys, or other judges,
according to the number of cases he settles or terminates, he may feel
compelled to engage in coercive tactics in order to prompt docket
clearing. Or, he may participate in behavior that is less obviously
egregious (e.g., verbal criticism or impatience with attorneys or litigants
who are reluctant to settle), but is nevertheless forbidden by the Code
of Judicial Conduct.85 Although many judges recognize that such activity
falls clearly outside the proper judicial function,8' it has nevertheless
been demonstrated in numerous cases.87
Furthermore, judicial involvement in settlement may violate the Canon
of Ethics which mandates that "[t]he judicial duties of a judge take
precedence over all his other activities."88 United States District Judge
Hubert L. Will has admitted that the judicial role in settlement is "not
that of a traditional judge, [it] is that of a mediator."'8 Thus, perhaps
it is proper for a judge to engage only in those activities expressly
provided for by Rule 16 rather than more activist involvement which
may be outside the contemplation of the Rule, (i.e., involvement that
is not expressly authorized by law and therefore unethical). Yet this,
too, presents a dilemma for the judiciary, because the Canons of Ethics
also direct a judge to be diligent and efficient (e.g., "[a] judge should
dispose promptly of the business of the court.").0 To this effect, some
states have established time limitations within which decisions must be
rendered.9' Although provisions such as these may ensure efficiency, the
85. See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 56.
86. See generally Wall, Rude & Schiller, supra note 5, at 38.
87. In re La Marre, 494 F.2d 753, 756 (6th Cir. 1974) ("[N]o judge can compel a
settlement prior to trial on terms which one or both parties find completely unacceptable.");
Citron v. ARO Corp., 377 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1967) (attempt to speed a case to completion
under threat of extensive delay a misuse of judicial power); Wolfe v. La Verne, 17 A.D.2d
213, 233 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1962) (error to accelerate trial date because one party had refused
an offer of settlement); Rosenfeld v. Vosper, 45 Cal. App. 2d 365, 114 P.2d 29 (1941)
(judge should not constantly suggest settlement to attorneys). But see Johnson v. Trueblood,
629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980) (no error for judge to state during settlement negotiations
that defendants were "honest men of high character"); Romines v. Illinois Motor Freight,
Inc., 21 Ill. App. 2d 380, 158 N.E.2d 97 (1959) (no error for judge to say in closed
conference that he hoped defendant would lose).
88. See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 56, Canon 3.
89. Will, Merhige & Rubin, supra note 32, at 205.
90. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 56, Canon 3A(5).
91. D. FRETZ, R. PEEPLES & T. WICKER, supra note 63, at 20. In Minnesota,
Wisconsin, and California, the time allowed is 90 days.
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attempt to conform to the mandates of both diligence and impartiality
under Canon 6 may leave many judges between a rock and a hard
place. Since there is little in the form of common law authority to guide
judicial behavior, the extent to which active judicial participation in
settlement is proper remains uncertain.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is clear at this point that judicial participation in and promotion
of settlement negotiations can be both beneficial and detrimental to the
interests of justice. On one hand, it results in speedy, inexpensive, and,
in the vast majority of cases, just resolution of civil disputes. On the
other hand, it is often effectuated through judicial behavior which is
considered contrary to the ethical considerations underlying the Code
of Judicial Conduct. In this author's opinion, much of the conflict could
be eliminated by congressional amendment of Rule 16 to reflect the
requirement that a judge who actively participates in pretrial settlement
activity be ineligible to hear the case if settlement efforts fail and
traditional adjudication is undertaken. In this manner, the worry over
potential impartiality resulting from judicial exposure to inadmissible
evidence and personal familiarity with the parties and attorneys is
completely avoided. Employment of this method places no additional
burden on court resources, yet provides greater assurance that justice
will be accomplished. Amendment of Rule 16 seems obviously preferable
to again altering the Code of Judicial Conduct to allow substantive ex
parte communications or qualify the requirements of diligence and
impartiality. Without the institution of corrective measures, judges may
either overstep the boundaries of ethical judicial involvement, or, for
fear that they might overstep them, will refrain from participation in
productive and valuable settlement negotiations.
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